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Insurance-Stacking-MULTIPLE RECOVERY PERMITTED UNDER SINGLE POLICY
INSURING MORE THA ONE V.EmcLE-Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of

North America, 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972); Lipscombe v. Security
Insurance Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
"Pyramiding" or "stacking" as applied to an automobile insurance policy
covering more than one vehicle occurs when a claimant under the provisions
of a policy is permitted to aggregate the limits of the units of coverage in
that policy to satisfy a claim against the insurer.1 This enables a maximum
possible recovery of a sum equal to the declared limits of the insurer's liability multiplied by the number of vehicles covered under the policy. The
Virginia Supreme Court has previously applied the concept of stacking to
a claim under the medical payments coverage provision of a multi-car policy.2 In two recent decisions, however, the court extended the use of stacking significantly by applying the theory in settling a claim under the uninsured motorist provision for a policy insuring more than one vehicle.

In Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of North America3 and Lipscombe v.
Security Insurance Co.,- the Virginia Supreme Court held that under the
uninsured motorist provisions of automobile insurance policies covering more
than one vehicle where multiple premiums were paid, an insured of the first
class as defined by statute, or his personal representative, could stack units
of coverage in the absence of "'plain, unmistakable language' to prevent
'stacking'-.... ,,5
The issue of stacking arises when the courts are required to construe the
provisions of automobile insurance policies that insure more than one vehicle
where the claimant seeks a recovery in excess of stated limits of coverage.
The courts have been selective in permitting stacking, and the criteria for
the application of the theory appear to be based upon the type of insurance
coverage upon which a claim is made.
1See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1966); Sturdy
v. Allied Mur. Ins. Co, 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34 (1969); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zellars,
452 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); Comment, Pyramiding of Imurance Coverage
Under the Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy, 14 VmL. L. REv. 279 (1969).
The terms "stacking" and "pyramiding" have also been used to describe the situation
in which the claimant seeks to obtain a recovery at the aggregate limits of several
policies. Thompson v. Certified Indem. Co., 495 P.2d 252 (Colo. App. 1972); Bailes v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 123 (La. App. 1971); Thurman v.
Signal Ins. Co, - Ore. -,491 P.2d 1002 (1971).
2
Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 212 Va. 162, 183 S.E.2d 145 (1971);
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963).
3 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972).
4 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
5 Id. at 84, 189 S.E.2d at 323.
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Where a claim is made under the medical payment provisions of a policyu
the courts have shown a willingness to permit stacking, although there is
a split of authority. 7 In those jurisdictions where stacking is permitted under
medical payments coverage the courts have grounded their holdings on three
distinct lines of reasoning. First, the separability clause," which states that
the terms of the policy should apply separately to each vehicle, and the clause
limiting the liability of the insurer, are said to create an ambiguity.9 The
well-settled principle of insurance law in such a case is to construe the policy
strictly against the insurer, providing the insured with maximum protection.' 0
Second, the separability clause and the fact that the insured had paid multiple
premiums are viewed as providing a basis for finding that one insurance policy is, in effect, two insurance contracts." The insured is then entitled to
6 For an example of a medical payments provision in a standard automobile insurance
policy, see R. KEETON, BAsIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW, App. H, at 662 (1971).
7In the following cases the courts have permitted a maximum recovery of the aggregate limits of the medical payments provisions of a policy insuring more than one
vehicle. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 234 Ark. 1100, 356 S.V.2d 613
(1962); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1966);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, 111 Ga. App. 98, 140 S.E.2d 505 (1965); Harlow v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Southwestern Fire and Cas. Co. v. Atkins, 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Virginia
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 212 Va. 162, 183 S.E.2d 145 (1971); Central Sur.
& Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963). But see Sullivan v. Royal
Exch. Assurance, 181 Cal. App. 2d 644, 5 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1960); Bost v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 242 So. 2d. 355 (La. App. 1970); Odom v. American Ins. Co,
213 So. 2d 359 (La. App. 1968); Guillory v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 203 So. 2d 762
(La. App. 1967); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C.
348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970).
8
See R. KEETON, BAsic TExT ON INSURANCE LAW, App. H, at 664 (1971); Annot., 37
A.L.R.3d 1263 n.1 (1971). For an excellent discussion of the problem of multi-recovery
under one policy insuring more than one vehicle focusing on problems created by the
separability clause, see Comment, Pyramnidingof Insurance Coverage Under the Standard
Family Automobile Liability Policy, 14 VILL. L. REv. 279 (1969).
9 See generally Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963).
10 E.g., Rowe v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 375 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1967);
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n. v. Pinkard, 356 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1966); Wilkerson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 119 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Va. 1953); American Fidelity Fire Ins Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 212 Va. 302, 184 S.E.2d 11 (1971); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Dervishian, 206
Va. 563, 145 S.E.2d 184 (1965); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Fratarcangelo, 201 Va. 672, 112
S.E.2d 892 (1960); Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 2 S.E.2d 303 (1939).
The development of the principle in insurance law is explained by the nature of the
insurance contract.
Insurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion under which the insured
is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions offered him
even when the standard forms are prescribed by public officials rather than in-

surers. R.

KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw

§ 6.3, at 350 (1971).

11See generally Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, 111 Ga. App. 98, 140 S.E.2d 505
(1965).
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the benefit of each contract and a stacked recovery is permitted. Finally;
by the provisions of the policy it is impossible to relate coverage to any particular vehicle. 12 Thus the limits of the liability clause must be applied separately to each premium paid and the aggregate limits are recoverable.
In contrast, the logic upon which a stacked recovery is permitted in cases
involving medical payments coverage has been clearly rejected by the courts
where the liability provisions of a policy covering more than one vehicle are
in issue.' 3 The courts have held that with respect to liability provisions
the separability clause creates no ambiguity 14 and provides no basis for holding that one policy should be treated as two insurance contracts. 15 A Washington court has held that with respect to the liability provisions the separability clause "merely assures the applicability of the policy to whichever
car is involved in an accident...

."

16

The rationale for stacking appears less plausible when applied to liability
provisions because they differ from medical payment coverage. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the stacking argument under liability provisions of a multi-car policy; it felt that cases involving liability coverage
are clearly distinguishable from those where stacking is permitted under the
medical payment provisions. 17 Under the medical payment provisions of a
policy, broad protection is afforded a particular class of persons independent
of any liability on the part of the insured. Liability coverage, on the other
hand, is generally seen as connected to the vehicle causing the accident,
Linking liability coverage to a particular vehicle removes the basis for finding policy ambiguity that is the rationale for permitting stacking under the
miedical payments provisions.
In the few cases dealing with uninsured motorist provisions the courts
have either refused to allow stacking, linking coverage to a particular vehicle as in liability coverage cases,' 8 or have followed the logic of the cases
12
13

Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. App. 1965).

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mole, 414 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1969); Greer v. Associated Indem.
Corp. 371 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568
(4th Cir. 1964); Yates v. Interinsurance Exch, 275 Cal. App. 2d 301, 79 Cal. Rptr. 604
App. 2d 190, 203 N.E.2d 748 (1964); Polland
(1969); Cook v. Suburban Cas. Co., 54 Ill.
v,Allstate Ins. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966); Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Thompson, 56 Wash. 2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960); Rosar v. General Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d
95, 163 N.W.2d 129 (1968).
14 See Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Wash. 2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960); Rosar
v. General Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 95, 163 N.W.2d 129 (1968).
I Polland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 16,266 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966).
16 Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Wash. 2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960).
7
1 E.g., Rosar v. General Ins. Co., 41 Wis. 2d 95, 163 N.W.2d 129 (1968).
18 Morrison Assurance Co. v. Polak, 230 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969); Otto v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
2 Ill. App. 3d 58, 275 N.E.2d 766 (1971); Kennedy v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co.,
255 Ore. 425, 467 P.2d 963 (1970); Castle v. Union Pac. Ins. Group, 252 Ore. 44, 448
P.2d 357 (1968).
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where stacking under medical payments provisions has been allowed. 19 This
dichotomy is understandable considering the nature of the insurance in-.
volved. Uninsured motorist coverage, 20 a fairly recent phenomenon in the
insurance industry, is designed to provide innocent accident victims with
some protection from the negligence of the financially irresponsible motorist.
It has been described as a hybrid type of insurance. 21 As in liability insurance the fault element is retained in that the insured must show that his loss
was the fault of an uninsured motorist before any obligation is incurred by.
his insurer. Like accident insurance, however, uninsured motorist insurance
is first person, with the benefit accruing to the insured, rather than to a
third party who has suffered loss at the hands of the insured, as in the case
of liability coverage. In Cunningham and Lipseombe the Virginia Supreme
Court emphasized the first class character of uninsured motorist coverage.
The Virginia court had previously allowed stacking of coverage under
medical payments coverage under a multi-vehicle policy in Central Surety
& Insurance Co. v. Elder.2 2 In that case the court based its ruling upon an
ambiguity created by the irreconcilability of the separability clause and the
limits of liability clause. In Cunningham and Lipscombe, however, the court
based its decisions on a different logic. The court held uninsured motorist
coverage2 3 for an insured of the first class could not be related to any par39See Sellers v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 214 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1968); Rosson
v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 795, 457 P.2d 42 (1969); Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co,
203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34 (1969); Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d
32020 (1972); Cunningham v. Insurance Co., 213 Va. 72, 189 S.E.2d 832 (1972).
Uninsured motorist coverage was developed by the insurance industry during the
late 1950's as an alternative to compulsory insurance. Under the provisions of the uninsured motorist endorsement, the insurer undertakes to compensate the insured for certain
losses arising out of an accident caused by an uninsured motorist. For a general discussion of the nature and development of uninsured motorist coverage, see A. Wmiss,
A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (1969); Notman, A Decennial Study of the
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 1968 INs. L. J. 22, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER; Soich,
Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Past, Present and Future, 6 DuQ. L.REv. 341 (1968);
Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw.U.L.REv. 497 (1967). For
a treatment focusing on the uninsured motorist endorsement in Virginia see Denny,
Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Presentand Future, 52 VA. L. REv. 538 (1966); Kemper
& Johnson, Insurance, 1969-1970 Survey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1356 (1970);
Note, Insurance, 1970-1971 Survey of Virginia Law, 57 VA. L. REV. 1608 (1971); Comment, The Virginia Uninsured Motorist Law: Its Intent and Purpose, 7 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 106 (1966).
21 R. KEETON, BAsic TExr ON INSURANcE LAw § 4.9 (d), at 245 (1971).
22204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963).
2
31n Virginia uninsured motorist coverage is a mandatory requirement of all automobile insurance policies issued or delivered in the state.
Nor shall any such policy or contract relating to ownership, maintenance or use
of a motor vehicle be so issued or delivered unless it contains an endorsement or
provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally en-

19721

RECENT DECISIONS

ticular vehicle, and payment of multiple premiums in such a case created an
ambiguity as to the amount of coverage afforded the insured.
Relying on a recent Kansas case, 24 the Virginia court in Cunningham
noted that the legislature intended in passing the uninsured motorist statute
to create two distinct classes of insured. 25 Under this logic an insured of
the first class is afforded a broad scope of protection that is not linked to
occupancy of any particular vehicle, while an insured of the second class
can recover only if he is an occupant of a specific insured vehicle. 26 Under
a policy covering more than one vehicle, the payment of one premium
entitles an insured of the first class to coverage up to the stated limits of
the policy. The court reasoned that the payment of a second premium under
circumstances where coverage was not linked to a vehicle raised a reasonable
expectation of additional coverage,27 and consequently, an ambiguity in the
tided to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle within limits which shall be no less than the requirements of 46.1-1(8) as
amended from time to time.... VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (b) (1970).
At the present, minimum statutory limits are $20,000 per person and $40,000 for bodily
injury
per accident. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-1(8), (Cum. Supp. 1972).
24
Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co, 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34' (1969). The claimant in
Sturdy, a policeman, was injured while on'duty when an uninsured motorist collided
with the motorcycle he was riding. A claim was submitted in accordance with the
uninsured motorist provisions of the claimant's policy. Neither of the claimant's two cars
were involved in the accident. The defendant insurer paid a sum of $10,000, equal to the
stated limits of coverage. Claimant brought an action against the insurer maintaining that
he was entitled to aggregate the limits of coverage under his policy which insured two
owned vehicles.
25Cunningham v. Insurance Co., 213 Va. 72, 75-77, 189 S.E.2d, 832, 834-35 (1972);
Insurance Co.v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418 (1964).
26 Cunningham v. Insurance Co, 213 Va. 72, 77, 189 S.E.2d 832, 834-35 (1972). In
Cunningham the decedent was killed while an occupant of a vehicle for which his employer carried uninsured motorist coverage. Under his employer's policy the decedent
was an insured of the second class; while his personal representative could recover the
stated limits, the court specifically held that stacking could not be applied under a
policy where the claimant was a second class insured.
27Id. at 78-79, 189 S.E2d at 836-37. The position of the court in Cunningham and
Lipscombe may be better understood in terms of the developing principle of "reasonable
expectations" applied to insurance contractg instead of the traditional argument of policy

ainbiguity.
The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions may have negated those expectations. R. KiCTON, BAsIc TExT ON INsuRANcE LAw § 6.3 (a), at 351 (1971).
But see Ringenberger v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 214 So. 2d "376
(Fla. App. 1968). The Florida lower court held that the limits of liability clause unambiguously laid out the extent of the insurer's obligation. It rejected the argument
that there was no consideration for the second premium. The policy in question contained an exclusionary clause that excluded from coverage any bodily injury sustained
while occupying a vehicle owned by the named insured other than the insured auto-
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policy. As is the well established principle, the court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the insured and permitted stacking of the limits of
coverage.
In Lipscombe v. Security Insurance Co.,28 the Virginia court emphatically
indicated that it had no intention of applying the logic of tying coverage
to a particular vehicle in dealing with an insured of the first class under the
uninsured motorist coverage. The insurance company in Lipscombe argued
that it had expressly made the separability clause inapplicable to the uninsured motorist provisions, thereby removing the source of any ambiguity.
The court rejected this argument, holding that the exclusion of the clause
did not prevent the stacking concept from being applied. 30 The court emphasized that "uninsured motorist coverage is designed to protect not vehicles but persons, i.e., the innocent victims of negligent uninsured motorists." 31 Coverage is dependent upon the status of the insured at the time
of injury within the classes created, and is not related to any particular
vehicle. 32 It was held that the insured must be informed of the limitations
of coverage in " 'plain, unmistakable language.' "3 The exclusion of the ambiguous separability clause did not accomplish this, and the claimant was
entitled to recover up to the aggregate limits of the policy covering two
34
vehicles.
Application of the stacking concept to an automobile policy insuring
more than one vehicle is a clear manifestation of a public policy position
which affords the purchasers of automobile insurance maximum protection.
The Virginia court, by permitting a stacked recovery where medical payments provisions 35 were at issue and, more recently, under the uninsured
motorist endorsement, has taken a consumer protective stance with regard
to automobile insurance. It is submitted that permitting a multiple recovery
under the uninsured motorist provision of a single policy insuring more
than one vehicle is an overextension of the stacking concept.
As a result of Cunningham and Lipscombe, an insured with a policy covering more than one vehicle is in a far better position to obtain a full recovery for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident if he is the
mobile. The court felt that not having the second car excluded from coverage constituted consideration for the additional premium.
28213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
29 See note 8 supra.
s0 Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 84, 189 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1972).
81 Id. at 82-83, 189 S.E.2d at 322-23.
32 Id. at 84, 189 S.E.2d at 323.
33 Id.

341d.
85 Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 212 Va. 162, 183 S.E.2d 145 (1971);
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963).
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innocent victim of an uninsured motorist than if the party at fault had
liability insurance. Under the uninsured motorist provisions of his own
policy, the insured has the potential of a stacked recovery. Recovery under
the liability provisions of the negligent driver's policy would be limited to
the stated limits; the complete absence of precedent and the nature of liability coverage make the application of the stacking theory unlikely.
By statute in Virginia36 an insured may obtain additional uninsured motorist coverage, but such coverage cannot exceed the liability coverage in the
same policy. Assuming that the stacking could not be applied to liability
coverage, the court in Cunningham and Lipscombe has created the exact
result that the legislature sought to prevent in passing that statute: an insured's de facto uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the coverage of his
37
liability provisions.
The stacking concept poses serious problems to the insurance industry,
and the urgency of the situation is demonstrated by the frequency with
which cases involving the stacking issue appear before the court. While
remedial action in the form of legislation has been attempted previously in
the area of multiple recovery, it has met with no success and by its nature
is "stopgap." 38
It is submitted that remedial action should be undertaken by the insurance
industry itself. Poorly drafted policy provisions beget ambiguity. A redraft
26
"[S]aid insured, after January one, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, shall be offered
the opportunity to contract, at an additional premium, for limits higher than those pro"vided in 5 46.1-1(8) so long as such limits do not exceed the limits of the automobile
liability coverage provided by such policy." VA. CODE ANNt. § 38.1-381 (b) (1970).
37 The inequity of permitting a multiple recovery under the uninsured motorist endorsement has been noted previously where the aggregate limits of coverage were
claimed under several policies. It 'has been argued that the design and purpose of the
uninsured motorist endorsement was to provide the insured with no more insurance
protection than if the insured were injured by an operator with a policy containing
the minimum statutory limits of liability coverage. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Sellers, 179 So. 2d 608 (Fla. App. 1965); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422,
213 A.2d 420 (1965); 7 BrAsmIELD, ATrromoiLE LAW AND PRAcicE § 274.42, at 145-46
(3d ed. 1966); Denny, UninsuredMotorist Coverage-Presentand Future, 52 VA. L. REv.
538 (1966).
The substance of this argument has been negated by legislative adoption of the above
section of the code. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (b) (1970). By permitting the purchase
of uninsured motorist coverage in excess of the minimum required by statute the potential clearly exists for an insured to carry more uninsured motorist coverage than the
minimum required liability insurance that a potential accident causing driver must carry.
38 Legislation was introduced in the wake of a Virginia Supreme Court decision that
permitted a multiple recovery under two different policies. See Bryant v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965). The bill, which died in committee, would have limited recovery to the limits of one uninsured motorist endorsement
regardless of the number of endorsements that may be applicable. See Denny, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage-Presentand Future,52 VA. L. REv. 538, 559 n.101 (1966).
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of those policy provisions that spawn the stacking issue clearly delineating
the insurer's obligations under the policy would resolve the problem at its
roots. The insurance industry must be prepared to protect itself in a judicial environment of consumer protection. 9
D.O.L.

89

The insurance industry in Virginia is regulated by the State Corporation Commission. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-29 (1970). The language of all insurance policies issued or
delivered within the state must conform to the precise standards delineated by the
commission. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-382 to 389 (1970). Within the framework of
the statutory law there are two courses of action that the insurance industry should
pursue. First, the industry collectively should prepare a modification to the present
standard policy incorporating language that would clearly limit the obligation of the
insurer to the stated limits of the policy. This modified policy could then be presented
to the commission as the new standardized policy. The Commission is empowered, at
its own discretion, to adopt a standardized policy to be used by all insurance policies
written or delivered within the state. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-382 (1970).
Realizing that collective action may require time, there is another less time consuming
course of action that insurers could initiate individually to amend the standard form.
Additional provisions may be used with such standard form by any insurer with
the approval of the Commission provided the Commission shall first determine
that such additional provisions are not in conflict or inconsistent with the standard
form or the laws of this State or any of the rules and regulations lawfully made
pursuant thereto. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-387 (1970).
The Lipscombe court referred to a Florida case in which uninsured motorist coverage was at issue, and in which the stacking argument was rejected. The policy
language was held clearly to limit the insurer's liability.
The insurance policy on which plaintiffs base their claim for judgment clearly
provides that regardless of the number of vehicles insured thereunder, or the
number of insureds who may sustain damages in any one accident, the limit of
the company's liability shall be the amount set forth in the declarations clause
of the policy. Hilton v. Citizens Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. App. 1967).
See also Hansen v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 Ga. App. 528, 157 S.E.2d 768 (1967)
where similar language was held to prevent stacking under a medical payments provision of a multi-car policy.

